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The basic premise of this chapter is that ultimately what is of concern to
an investor, whether a household or an institutional investor such as a life
insurance company or a pension fund, is the real value of its investments
in terms of purchasing power over consumer goods and services. The
issue to be addressed is what investment strategies make sense in an
economic environment in which a major factor (although certainly not
the only one) to be considered is substantial uncertainty about the future
level of the prices of those goods and services. By investment strategy I
mean decisions about how to allocate investable funds among four major
asset classes: common stocks and other equity investments; long-term,
fixed-interest debt instruments; short-term or variable-rate debt instru-
ments; and other "inflation-hedging" assets such as commodity futures
contracts or commodity-linked bonds.
The chapter is organized as follows. I will first discuss why it is real or
inflation-adjusted rates of return and their uncertainty which ought to be
the main concern of investors. I will then present an analytical framework
for formulating investment strategy, examine the historical record of real
rates of return on the four asset categories, and derive estimates of
alternative risk-return tradeoff curves. Finally, I will discuss the implica-
tions of my findings for individual and institutional asset allocation poli-
cies.
Zvi Bodie is Professor of Economics and Finance at Boston University's School of
Management and Co-Director of the NBER project on the economics of the U.S. pension
system.
The author wishes to thank his colleague, Alex Kane, and his research assistant, Michael
Rouse, for their valuable help in preparing this chapter.
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3.1 Why It Is Real Investment Returns
and Their Uncertainty That Matter
With respect to the individual investor, i.e., the household, there can
be little doubt that the dollar value of its investment portfolio is not what
counts, but rather its real value in terms of purchasing power. It follows,
therefore, that households will be concerned about the real or inflation-
adjusted rate of return rather than the nominal rate of return on their
investments. If the future rate of inflation were known with certainty, it
would make no difference whether households were making their port-
folio decisions on the basis of real or nominal rates of return. The
expected real rate on any particular asset would just be the nominal rate
less the known inflation rate, and its real risk would be the same as its
nominal risk. But in an environment of uncertainty about future inflation
there can be a great difference between the real and nominal risk associ-
ated with an asset. The most extreme example is the case of conventional
bonds and mortgages, which offer a guaranteed nominal return to an
investor, but a highly uncertain real one. As inflation becomes more
certain, these instruments become riskier and less attractive to house-
holds.
But what about institutional investors? Should they be concerned with
real or nominal rates of return? Institutional investors are financial
intermediaries between the nonfinancial business sector and the house-
hold sector of the economy. Their ultimate survival and success depend
on providing households with the kinds of financial assets that households
want to hold. In our inflationary environment contractual savings plans
such as ordinary life insurance policies, which offer guaranteed nominal
cash flows, and money-fixed annuities have become unattractive. In
order to maintain their viability, life insurance companies must respond
by offering new products and adjusting their investment policies accord-
ingly. Elsewhere I have discussed the feasibility of indexed annuities as a
possible innovation for providing stable real retirement income in an
inflationary environment, and many other suggestions along these lines
are bound to be forthcoming in the future. (Bodie 1980). The central
concern of investment policy in this new environment will surely be real
rates of return and their uncertainty.
What about pension plans and pension funds? Why should they care
about real rates of return? Under many corporate defined-benefit pen-
sion plans, the starting level of the retirement benefit promised to the
worker is based on an average of the worker's wage in the last several
years prior to retirement. If, as in the past, wages increase in tandem with
consumer prices, then such a plan's liabilities are in effect indexed during
the phase of benefit accrual. Furthermore, it is likely that the future
evolution of pension plans is going to be in the direction of at least partial
indexation of benefits in the postretirement phase too. Thus, at least49 Investment Strategy
these pension funds have to plan their investment strategy with a focus on
real rates of return too.
3.2 The Theory of Portfolio Selection
The analytical framework which underlies the investment strategies I
will present in this chapter is known as mean-variance analysis, and it
goes back almost thirty years to the pioneering work by Markowitz
(1952). The basic premise underlying this approach is that the investor is
risk averse; that is to say, given a choice between two investments
offering the same mean (or average) rate of return, the investor always
chooses the one that has less risk. Risk in the context of this analysis is
identified with the unpredictability or uncertainty of achieving one's
expected rate of return and is measured by its variance or standard
deviation.
The investor's decision process is divided into two stages. In the first
stage he computes what his risk-return opportunities are, and in the
second he chooses the risk-return combination which suits him best. In
stage one, the investor starts by finding the minimum-risk strategy,
determining the mean rate of return associated with it, and then proceed-
ing to derive other portfolios which offer higher and higher means with
the least possible risk. The result of this part of the process is a tradeoff
curve showing the terms-of-trade between risk and expected return.
1
The inputs needed to generate the tradeoff curve are the means and
standard deviations of the real rates of return on the individual assets and
the correlations among them. In the following section we examine what
these parameters have been over the past twenty-seven years and discuss
our assumptions about their current values.
3.3 Inflation and Asset Returns: The Historical Record
Table 3.1 contains the historical record of real pretax rates of return on
each of four categories of assets for the period 1953 through 1979. The
measure of the price level that was used in adjusting these rates of return
was the Personal Consumption Expenditures Deflator published by the
U.S. Department of Commerce. This measure was chosen rather than
the Department of Labor's Consumer Price Index (CPI) because serious
doubts about the adequacy of the CPI as a measure of true inflation have
been raised in the past seven or eight years. The main objection to the
CPI is that it gives too much weight to new mortgage rates in the
computation of shelter costs. The last two columns in Table 3.1 present
the rate of inflation as measured first by the Consumer Price Index, then














































































































































































































The real returns were calculated according to the formula
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1 + rate of inflation
using the PCE Deflator inflation rate. The rate of return on commodity futures in column 4
was calculated differently, as explained in the text.
SOURCES: The data on 1-month bills, 20-year bonds, and stocks are from Ibbotson and
Sinquefield (1977), updated by the authors. The commodity futures series was derived from
price data in the Wall Street Journal using a method explained in the text. The data on the
CPI and the PCE deflator are from U.S. Department of Labor and Department of Com-
merce, respectively.51 Investment Strategy
as measured by the Personal Consumption Expenditures Deflator. There
are serious differences between the two series, especially in 1974 and
1979; but as the correlation coefficient of .977 reported at the bottom of
Table 3.1 indicates, they are highly positively correlated.
The first column in Table 3.1 is the real rate of return on a policy of
"rolling over" thirty-day Treasury bills, and is representative of the rate
of return on money market instruments. This is by far the least volatile
series, with a standard deviation of only 1.14 percent. This is because
over this period, short-term interest rates have tended to follow rather
closely movements in the rate of inflation.
Of course, this is not a coincidence. All market-determined interest
rates contain an "inflation premium," which reflects expectations about
the declining purchasing power of the money borrowed over the life of
the loan. As the rate of inflation has increased in recent years, so too has
the inflation premium built into interest rates. While long-term as well as
short-term interest rates contain such a premium, conventional long-term
bonds lock the investor into the current interest rate for the life of the
bond. If long-term interest rates on new bonds subsequently rise as a
result of unexpected inflation, the funds already locked in can be released
only by selling the bonds on the secondary market at a price well below
their face value. But if an investor buys only short-term bonds with an
average maturity of about thirty days, then the interest rate he earns will
lag behind changes in the inflation rate by at most one month.
The problem with money market instruments, however, is their low
rate of return. Over the past twenty-seven years, the average pretax,
inflation-adjusted rate of return on money market instruments has been
barely half a percent per year. In the most recent six-year period, that
return has actually been negative. Perhaps the most likely scenario for
the future is that inflation-adjusted returns will hover around zero, i.e.,
the interest rate will be about equal to the rate of inflation.
Column 2 presents the real rate of return an investor would have
earned by investing in U.S. Treasury bonds with a twenty-year maturity.
The assumption underlying this series is that the investor bought a
twenty-year bond at the beginning of each year and sold it at the end. His
return therefore includes both coupon interest and capital gains or losses.
As the relatively low mean and high standard deviation indicate, the past
twenty-seven years was a bad period for the investor in long-term bonds.
Capital losses caused by unanticipated increases in interest rates usually
more than cancelled the coupon yield over this period.
It would probably be a mistake to assume that the mean real rate of
return on long-term government bonds in the future is going to be the
-.87% per year that it was over the 1953 to 1979 period. A more
reasonable approach to estimating the ex ante mean real rate would be to
take the yield to maturity on long-term government bonds and subtract
an estimate of the mean rate of inflation expected to prevail over the next52 Zvi Bodie
twenty years. When we do this we find a mean real rate of return on U.S.
Treasury bonds of 2% per year.
Column 3 in Table 3.1 presents the real rate of return on the Standard
and Poor's Composite Index of common stocks, which is a value-
weighted stock portfolio of the five hundred largest corporations in the
United States. The return includes dividends and capital gains. The mean
real rate over our sample period was 7.08% per year, but we will use 10%
per year as our estimate of the ex ante mean in our computations of the
tradeoff curve. There are two main reasons for doing so. The first is that
several recent careful studies of the real rate of return on unlevered
corporate capital (i.e., the return to debt and equity combined) indicate it
to be in the range of 6 to 7% per year (Brainard, Shoven, and Weiss 1980;
Feldstein and Summers 1977; Holland and Myers 1977). Since the aver-
age debt-equity ratio for the S&P 500 companies is about V3, and the
after-tax real interest rate on corporate borrowing is quite negative, a
10% mean real rate of return on levered equity seems plausible.
2 The
second reason is that 10% per year is the estimate of the mean real rate of
return on the S&P 500 derived by Merton (1980) in a recent National
Bureau of Economic Research study employing a new estimation tech-
nique, which incorporates more information than just the simple average
of past rates.
Finally, let us focus our attention on column 4 in Table 3.1, which
presents the annual rate of return one would have earned on a well-
diversified portfolio of commodity futures contracts over the 1953 to 1979
period. The rate of return on a futures contract reflects the proportional
change in the futures price over the holding period. The series was
generated by assuming a "buy-and-hold" strategy whereby contracts
were entered into at quarterly intervals, held for three months, and then
liquidated. The number of commodities increases from thirteen in 1953 to
twenty-two by the end of the period. Table 3.2 presents the list of
commodities and the year in which each was added to the portfolio. The
portfolio was assumed to consist of equal dollar amounts invested in each
commodity contract.
The rates of return for commodity futures listed in column 4 of Table
3.1 require a different interpretation than the real rates in columns 1
through 3. When an investor takes a long position in a futures contract, he
2. The relationship between the rate of return on levered equity (ROE), the rate of
return on total capital (ROC), the after-tax interest rate on debt (I), and the debt/equity
ratio is given by the formula:
Debt
ROE = ROC + (ROC -1)
Equity
Assuming a 15% per year nominal interest rate on corporate debt, a 50% tax rate, and a
12% per year expected rate of inflation, we get a real after-tax interest rate on the debt of
- 4.5% per year. Substituting this value into the formula for /, 6.5% per year for ROC, and





















































does not buy it in the sense that he would buy a stock or bond or the
physical commodity itself; rather, he agrees to purchase the commodity
for a specified price at a certain point in the future. The commodities
exchange, which acts as an intermediary, requires all parties to a futures
contract to post a bond called "margin" to guarantee performance.
3
Investors are permitted to post Treasury bills, on which they continue to
earn the interest, so the funds used as margin are therefore not strictly
speaking an investment in commodity futures. The rates of return re-
ported in column 4 should therefore be interpreted as the addition to the
total investment portfolio rate of return that the investor would have
earned in each year had he taken a position in commodity futures with a
face value equal to his total investment in other assets.
In order for a buy-and-hold strategy in the futures market to be
profitable, it is not enough for spot prices to be rising; they must rise by
more than was anticipated in the futures price at the time the contract was
entered into. On average, one might expect the spot price forecasts
implicit in futures prices to be right, and therefore expect the mean rate of
return on futures contracts to be zero.
4 But what is more important for
our purposes, futures contracts will yield a positive rate of return when
there are unanticipated increases in spot prices, and it is this feature which
makes them valuable as an inflation hedge.
The critical parameters which determine how valuable commodity
futures are in this role, and which play a crucial role in determining the
shape of the tradeoff curve, are the correlation coefficients presented at
the bottom of Table 3.1. Perhaps the most significant thing to notice is
3. Margins on commodity figures contracts are typically quite low, ranging from 7 to 10
percent of the face value of the contract. For more detail about the commodity futures series
see Bodie and Rosanksy (1980).
4. There is a good deal of controversy in the economics literature on this point. For
further discussion and references see Bodie and Rosansky (1980).54 Zvi Bodie
that the real rates of return on bills, bonds, and stocks are all negatively
correlated with inflation and all positively correlated with each other. But
commodity futures are positively correlated with the rate of inflation and
negatively correlated with the real rates of return on the other major asset
categories, and therefore can serve to reduce the risk associated with any
portfolio containing them.
The mean rate of return on our buy-and-hold strategy in commodity
futures during the 1953 to 1979 period was 7.13% per year, a strikingly
large number, and one which may not be an accurate indicator for the
future. In computing the tradeoff curve we will assume a mean of zero,
although we will also discuss the consequences of assuming a higher
value.
Before proceeding to our presentation of the risk-return tradeoff
curves in the next section, let us summarize the assumptions that we are
making about the key parameters relating to the real rates of return on
bills, bonds, stocks, and commodity futures and the interrelationships
among them. With regard to the means, we assume zero on bills, 2% on
bonds, 10% on stocks, and zero on commodity futures. With regard to
the standard deviations and correlations we assume the ones reported in
Table 3.1.
3.4 The Risk-Return Tradeoff
We will begin our analysis of the risk-return tradeoff by looking at
portfolios consisting only of stocks and bills. The minimum-risk invest-
ment strategy is to invest entirely in bills, in which case one's mean real
rate of return would be zero and one's standard deviation 1.14%. At the
other extreme one could invest everything in stocks, in which case the
mean real rate of return on the portfolio would be 10% and the standard
deviation 19.46%. Table 3.3 shows us the combinations of mean and
standard deviation of real rate of return an investor would achieve by
going from one of these extremes to the other.
5 Figure 3.1 graphs this
tradeoff curve as curve 1. For mean values above 1% per year, curve 1 is
very close to a straight line with a slope of .53, indicating an increase of
about two percentage points in standard deviation for every one per-
centage point increase in mean.
5. The formula for computing the standard deviation of the real rate of return on any
portfolio consisting of stocks and bills is:
SD
2 = (1 - X)
2 SDl + X
2 SD?+ 2*(1 - X)R SDb SDS
where SDb and SDS represent the standard deviations on bills and stocks, respectively, and
R the correlation coefficient between them. A'is the proportion of the portfolio invested in












































































In order to provide a clearer picture of the meaning of a movement
along the risk-return tradeoff curve, we have graphed in Figure 3.2 three
probability distributions, corresponding to the first three points on curve
1. They are based on the assumption that the distribution of the real rate
of return on the portfolios is normal, i.e., a "bell-shaped" curve. The first
corresponds to the portfolio consisting of bills only, which has a mean of
zero and a standard deviation of 1.14%; the second, to the portfolio
which has 90 percent invested in bills and ten percent invested in stocks
with a mean real rate of return of 1% per year and a standard deviation of
2.44%; and the third, to a portfolio which has eighty percent invested in
bills, twenty percent in stocks with a mean of 2% per year and a standard
deviation of 4.24%. As the proportion of the portfolio invested in stocks
and therefore the mean go up, the bell-shaped curve shifts to the right and
becomes more flat or stretched out, indicating greater upside potential
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Now let us consider what the tradeoff curve would look like if the
investor were restricted to combinations of bonds and stocks. This curve
is tabulated in Table 3.4 and graphed as curve 2 in Figure 3.1. Note that as
we move up curve 2 from a bonds-only portfolio to one containing a little
stock, the standard deviation actually falls a bit before starting to grow.
The minimum-risk stock-bond portfolio contains 6.4% stocks and 93.6%
bonds and has a mean and standard deviation of 2.51% per year and
6.64%, respectively.
6 This implies that no risk-averse investor would ever
rationally choose to hold a bonds-only portfolio, since by substituting a
small amount of stock for some of the bonds, he could both increase his
expected rate of return and reduce his risk.
As a comparison of curves 1 and 2 makes clear, at mean real rates of
return greater then 3.5%, the stock-bond portfolios have less risk for any
mean than do the corresponding stock-bill portfolios. On the other hand,
for mean values below 3.5%, stock-bill portfolios have less risk for any
mean than do the corresponding stock-bond portfolios. Perhaps more
important, however, is the fact that very low risk strategies are unattain-
able using only stocks and bonds. The minimum-risk stock-bond port-
folio still has a standard deviation of 6.64%, which is quite high compared
with the lower risk levels attainable with bills.




Note that when we combine bills with stocks, this formula yields a negative number for the
proportion of stocks, which means we would actually have to sell some stock short in order
to minimize risk. This explains why curve 1 in Figure 3.1 does not have the same shape as



































































The minimum-risk portfolio consists of 6.4 percent stocks and 93.6 percent bonds and has a
mean and standard deviation of 2.51 percent and 6.64 percent, respectively.
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Assumptions about real rates of return:
Bills Bonds
Mean 0% 2%
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Now let us consider portfolios containing all three assets: stocks,
bonds, and bills. The process of computing the tradeoff curve in this case
is more complicated than before, because for each value of mean real rate
of return, one must use an optimization procedure to find that portfolio
which has the lowest standard deviation (Markowitz 1952). The resulting
tradeoff curve and portfolio proportions are presented in Table 3.5 and
Figure 3.3, which allows us to compare the risk-return tradeoff curve
derived using all three assets with the two previously derived curves from
Figure 3.1.
The main improvement comes at the low-risk, low-return end of the
curve. The minimum-risk strategy is still to invest in bills only, but as we
move up the curve we replace bills with increasing amounts of both bonds
and stocks. This continues up to a mean of 5% per year. At higher means
bills disappear from the portfolio, and the proportion of bonds declines;
curve 3 just becomes identical to curve 2. One point of special interest on
curve 3, which is not tabulated in Table 3.5, is the point having the same
mean as the minimum-risk stock-bond portfolio on curve 2, i.e., 2.5%
per year. It consists of a portfolio with 53% bills, 28% bonds, and 19%
stocks and has a standard deviation of 4.78%, as opposed to the 6.64%
standard deviation of the minimum-risk stock-bond portfolio. Thus by
adding bills to the minimum-risk stock-bond portfolio one can achieve a
substantial reduction in risk with no loss in expected return.
Now we are ready to introduce commodity futures contracts into our
portfolio. It is important to remember that when we take a position in
commodity futures we are not actually using up any of our funds; our
funds are invested in stocks, bonds, and bills. We are simply taking a
position which has a face value equal to some specified proportion of the
total amount invested in these other assets. The only restriction on our
portfolio imposed by the futures contracts is that we must have an amount
invested in bills equal to at least 10% of the position in commodity
futures, to serve as margin.
The results with commodity futures included are presented in Table 3.6
and Figure 3.4. Note that the minimum-risk strategy is still to invest 100%
of our funds in bills, but it is now optimal to hedge that investment with a
small position in our well-diversified commodity futures portfolio by
taking a long position with a face value equal to 4% of the investment in
bills. Under our assumption that the mean rate of return on commodity
futures is zero, the mean real rate of return on our portfolio will remain
unaffected, but there will be a reduction in standard deviation.
Comparing curves 3 and 4 in Figure 3.4, we see that for any mean real
rate of return, introducing the right amount of commodity futures con-
tracts into our portfolio enables us to reduce our standard deviation by a
significant amount. The reduction in standard deviation increases stead-
ily the higher the mean value, and is at its greatest value at a mean of 9%












































































































futures - .521 - .359 -.333
left by .17% at the minimum-risk end of the curve and by .93% at the
other end.
Looking at the last four columns in Table 3.6 and comparing them with
the last three columns of Table 3.5, we see that the addition of commodity
futures contracts does not change the portfolio proportions of stocks,
bonds, and bills by much. The major effect is that bills no longer dis-
appear entirely from the portfolio as they did before when we moved to
high mean real rates of return, because now there is a need for bills to
serve as margin on the commodity futures contracts. We also see that as
we move to higher mean real rates of return and the investment in stocks
goes up, there is a steady increase in the size of the relative position in
commodity futures, although it never exceeds 34 percent of the total
value of the investment portfolio.
What is the effect on the tradeoff curve of assuming a positive mean
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results of assuming a 2% per year mean rate. Perhaps the best way to
describe the effect is as an upward shift of the entire curve. At any level of
risk it becomes possible to achieve a higher mean real rate of return, with
the gain being larger the higher the level of risk. Even the minimum-risk
portfolio now has a positive mean rate of return. It now becomes possible
to attain a 10% mean real rate of return with a standard deviation of only
16.39% instead of 19.46%, by holding a portfolio consisting of 86%
stocks, 8% bonds, 6% bills, and a position in commodity futures equal to
59% of the portfolio's value.
It should be stressed once again before ending this part of the chapter
that the role of commodity futures stems from the fact that it is the only














Effect of Increased Mean Rate of Return on
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the proportion of commodity futures in the portfolio rises in Table 3.6 as
the investment in stocks goes up is that the real return on stocks is
negatively correlated with inflation. I have performed the experiment of
deriving the tradeoff curve under the assumption that the real return on
stocks is uncorrelated with inflation, and the result is that there would be
virtually no role for commodity futures contracts in that case. It is their
value as a hedge against inflation, to offset the inflation risk associated
with the investment in stocks, that accounts for commodity futures'
significant role.
3.5 Implications of Findings for Asset Allocation
The first implication of our findings is that bills are the cornerstone of
any low-risk investment strategy. Here it is important to keep in mind
that bills for us are a proxy for all money market instruments and floating
rate debt. Our results indicate that in order to achieve a low degree of
risk, by which we mean a standard deviation below 4%, at least half of the
portfolio would have to be invested in these securities. Of course, along
with the low risk comes a low return.
Who might be interested in a low-risk strategy, despite its low return?
The prime candidates are probably retired people with a small-to-
moderate accumulation of assets and a low tolerance for risk. In Great
Britain the government has for years been selling bonds bearing a zero
real interest rate on a voluntary and restricted basis to citizens aged
sixty-five and over. These bonds have proven to be a very popular
investment.63 Investment Strategy
Our findings carry two important messages to institutional investors
such as life insurance companies. The first is that households can cur-
rently provide themselves with a fairly safe pretax real rate of return of
about zero by investing in money market funds. Therefore any new kind
of contractual savings plan would have to offer a similar rate. The second
is that if the insurance industry wanted to offer savings plans and/or
annuities with full or partial indexation they could hedge almost all of the
investment risk by investing primarily in money market instruments. In
fact, if they wanted to avoid the investment risk altogether, they could
offer them as variable annuities.
What can we say about the role of bonds and other long-term fixed
interest securities? The first point suggested by our findings is that one
can get along without bonds with very little loss of portfolio efficiency; the
improvement in the risk-return tradeoff that one gets from adding bonds
to stocks and bills is relatively minor. Some institutional portfolio man-
agers might say that the risk associated with long-term bonds is exagger-
ated in my findings because I have included in my measure of annual
returns unrealized capital gains and losses. Most insurance companies
and pension funds do not count unrealized capital gains or losses on
long-term bonds as part of their annual rate of return. But even if we
disregard them, any instrument which commits the investor to a fixed
nominal flow of coupon income and a money-fixed principal amount at
maturity is in fact extremely risky even for an investor with a long-run
horizon, in fact, especially for such an investor.
Many institutional investors have already come to the conclusion that
long-term fixed interest securities are too risky relative to their expected
return and have simply stopped investing in them. If that trend continues
we can expect to see the disappearance of these financial instruments
from the U.S. capital market. In Great Britain the market for long-term
fixed interest corporate debt disappeared rather quickly in 1974 and has
not reappeared since. If this market is to maintain its viability in the U.S.,
the mean real rate of return will have to be higher than in the past.
Finally, what are the implications of our findings for investments in
commodity futures contracts or other inflation-hedging assets? Our re-
sults indicate that as long as stocks are negatively correlated with infla-
tion, there is going to be a need for some kind of asset that has the
property that its rate of return is positively correlated with inflation.
Commodity futures contracts have the considerable advantage of already
being in existence and therefore can be used right away.
There are some new types of financial instruments that have started to
appear and may play an increasingly significant role in this regard in the
future. I am referring specifically to commodity-linked bonds, that is to
say, bonds whose principal and/or interest is linked to the price of some64 Zvi Bodie
commodity. The silver-linked bonds issued by the Sunshine Mining Cor-
poration are an example. Bonds linked to the price of petroleum and
other natural resources owned by the issuing corporation are being
actively discussed by the institutional investment community. These
securities would share with commodity futures contracts the property
that their rate of return would be positively correlated with the rate of
inflation. If significant inflation persists in the future, these kinds of
securities will probably come to play an important role in investment
portfolios.
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